A Constitutional Ambush: How ZANU-PF’s Planned Amendments Endanger Zimbabwe’s Democracy

Politics | Constitutional Analysis
By Shelton Muchena
February 10, 2026
Zimbabwe may be facing one of the most dangerous constitutional moments in its post-independence history, not through open repression or military takeover, but through carefully crafted legal changes designed to consolidate power and weaken democratic safeguards. Leaked and unconfirmed documents circulating in political circles suggest that ZANU-PF is preparing sweeping constitutional amendments that, taken together, amount to a quiet but profound assault on the people’s sovereignty.
At the heart of the proposed changes is the removal of direct presidential elections. Under the plan, the President would no longer be chosen by the electorate but selected by Parliament. In a political landscape dominated by ZANU-PF, this shift effectively transfers power from citizens to a ruling-party-controlled legislature, stripping Zimbabweans of their most direct democratic right. The presidency would cease to be a product of popular will and instead become an internal party decision, shielded from public accountability.
The reported extension of presidential and parliamentary terms from five to seven years deepens this democratic erosion. Longer terms reduce electoral frequency and weaken citizens’ ability to regularly assess and replace leadership. When combined with weakened electoral oversight, extended tenure risks entrenching political power while limiting meaningful democratic participation.
The proposed expansion of presidential appointments to Parliament further blurs the separation of powers. By increasing the number of appointed senators, the executive tightens its grip over the legislature, undermining Parliament’s independence and its constitutional role as a check on executive authority. A legislature dominated by loyalty rather than representation cannot effectively defend the public interest.
Equally alarming are the proposed changes to electoral administration. The reported transfer of the voters’ roll from the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission to the Registrar-General’s office threatens the integrity of elections by placing a critical electoral function in an institution widely viewed as partisan. The removal of delimitation responsibilities from ZEC further fragments electoral management, weakening the independence of the body constitutionally mandated to oversee elections. These changes risk turning elections into administrative exercises controlled by the executive rather than transparent democratic processes.
The proposed removal of public interviews in judicial appointments marks a retreat from transparency and accountability. Public interviews were introduced to promote merit-based selection and judicial independence. Their abolition raises serious concerns about the politicisation of the judiciary and the erosion of one of the last institutional safeguards against executive overreach.
The most dangerous and consequential proposal, however, lies in the subtle redefinition of the constitutional mandate of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces. The current Constitution obliges the military “to uphold this Constitution.” The proposed amendment would water down this duty to merely acting “in accordance with the Constitution.” This shift is not cosmetic; it is fundamental. Removing the obligation to uphold the Constitution weakens the Defence Forces’ responsibility to defend constitutional order against unlawful political actions. In a country with a history of military involvement in politics, this amendment risks normalising constitutional violations by stripping the armed forces of a clear duty to protect the supreme law of the land.
When those entrusted with arms are no longer explicitly bound to defend the Constitution, the document itself becomes vulnerable to political manipulation. A Constitution that cannot be defended is reduced to paper, not principle.
The proposed abolition of the Zimbabwe Gender Commission, by folding its mandate into the Human Rights Commission, further reflects a broader pattern of dismantling specialised oversight institutions. This move risks diluting focus on gender equality and weakening protections for groups that rely on dedicated constitutional mechanisms for representation and justice.
Taken together, these proposals do not represent isolated reforms. They form a coherent strategy to centralise power within the executive, weaken independent institutions, reduce citizen participation, and neutralise constitutional safeguards. This is not constitutional reform driven by national consensus or public interest. It is constitutional engineering aimed at political survival.
Although the document remains unconfirmed, its contents demand urgent national scrutiny. Constitutional change must be grounded in transparency, public consultation, and democratic consent. Zimbabwe’s Constitution was forged through struggle and compromise, reflecting the aspirations of its people. To dismantle it quietly, clause by clause, is to betray that legacy.
This moment is not merely about legal amendments. It is about the future of constitutional democracy in Zimbabwe and whether power will remain with the people or be permanently captured by the ruling elite.